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IN 1973,  THE  onset of an energy crisis in a world that for a century had 
been plagued..by potential oversupply of  fossil  fuels at existing market 
prices  caught  many  knowledgeable observers by  surprise. The  energy 
shortage immediately generated a search for a scapegoat or a rational ex- 
planation of the predicament  of the highly developed, capitalist economies, 
heavily based on energy resources, of the United States, Western Europe, 
and Japan. 
According to Leonard Silk, the mammoth multinational energy com- 
panies, afflicted by the same "pea-sized brain" that proved fatal to  the 
dinosaurs, either caused or exacerbated the problem. His analysis depicted 
corporate mastodons as relentlessly pursuing the goal of profit maximiza- 
tion; but it concluded that since "economics is not everything," society 
cannot be at the mercy "of corporations that have no other purpose than 
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profit-maximization,  however  legitimate  and useful  that objective  may be 
in a limited  context."'l 
Yet orthodox  economic  theory  has taught  that, given the right back- 
ground  assumptions,  businessmen's  single-minded  pursuit  of profit  oppor- 
tunities,  tempered  by competition  and the absence  of externalities,  would 
result  in an efficient  and optimum  allocation  of resources  and the maximi- 
zation  of the welfare  of the community.  Thus,  contrary  to Silk's  condem- 
nation, executives  of  multinational  energy companies should not be 
pilloried  for failing  to meet  the needs  of any one selfish  nation,  for in their 
pursuit  of profit  maximization,  they are unwittingly  maximizing  the eco- 
nomic welfare of mankind.  Responding  to  comments on the lack of 
competition  at various stages of the vertically integrated  oil industry, 
some students  of the industry claim that the international  supply of 
crude  oil is "the  same  as what  might  be expected  to arise  from  the opera- 
tion of the law of comparative  costs in a freely  competitive  international 
market."2  After all, the consumer  seemed  to be plentifully,  and cheaply, 
supplied. 
Even now that more economists  are willing  to acknowledge  how non- 
competitive  the oil-resource  market is, many continue to envision the 
problem  of depletable  fossil fuels in terms of determining  the "optimal 
social  management  of a stock of a nonrenewable  but essential  resource."3 
An immediate  consequence  of this way of conceptualizing  the problem  is 
to analyze  the existing  structure  of the resource  market  to see whether  it 
provides  "proper"  price  allocative  guidelines.  If it can be proven  that the 
market  "fails,"  then it follows (for those who use this approach)  that the 
role of the economist  is to design  policies  to improve  market  performance 
and  bring  it closer  to the competitive  ideal.  In other  words,  the first  instinct 
of many  economists  in this  field  is to leave  the decision  as to the time  rate  of 
exploitation  of exhaustible  resources  to the invisible  hand,  unless  a market 
failure  can be demonstrated  and a corrective  policy can be developed. 
1. Leonard  Silk, "Multinational  Morals,"  New York  Timnes,  March  5, 1974. 
2. J. E. Hartshorn,  Politics and World  Oil Economics:  An Accotut of the  International 
Oil  Industry  in ItsPolitical  Environment  (Praeger,  1962),  p. 340. Even  in 1974  studies  have 
been produced  to show that "prices  paid by consumers  for petroleum  products  reflect 
the actual  costs of suppliers  and are not 'padded'  by excess  profits.  The competitive  pro- 
cess has held industry  profits down." See Edward  J. Mitchell, U.S. Energy  Policy: A 
Primer  (Washington:  American  Enterprise  Institute,  1974), p. 103. 
3. Robert  M. Solow, "The  Economics  of Resources  or the Resources  of Economics," 
in American  Economic  Association,  Papers  and  Proceedings  of th?e Eighty-sixth  Annual 
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In the first section of this paper we deal with two related issues: First, 
can market prices, even in a competitive environment, provide adequate 
guidelines for approaching an efficient and optimal rate of utilization of 
exhaustible resources? Second, in a world of conglomerate energy com- 
panies, does rationality of entrepreneurial  policies imply anticompetitive 
and  antisocial behavior that  redistributes income  from  consumers to 
producers and owners of resource-bearing  property? Some policy implica- 
tions inevitably follow from this analysis. 
The second section presents our estimates of the market price for crude 
oil  required to  achieve the  stated  goal  of  Project Independence: self- 
sufficiency by  1980.4 Since the first section attempts to demonstrate that 
for policy purposes economists who seek to determine the efficiency of any 
given time rate of exploitation of oil properties only waste their own re- 
sources, it follows that no  one can tell whether Project Independence is 
on a socially optimal management path-that  is, whether self-sufficiency 
in  1980 will  maximize the  sum  of  discounted consumer and  producer 
surpluses. But once self-sufficiency is established as a desirable goal by 
society's decisionmakers, economists can examine alternative paths to that 
objective and their implications for prices, income distribution, and pro- 
duction flows.5 
In the second section we have estimated the 1980 market-clearing,  long- 
run price necessary to achieve self-sufficiency, given the historical supply 
and demand elasticities for petroleum. A sensitivity analysis of this estimate 
to variations in supply and demand elasticities is also presented. 
Market Prices and Exhaustible Resources 
In a recent paper William Nordhaus not only succinctly summarized the 
foundation for the orthodox economic belief in the desirability of a laissez- 
faire approach to exhaustible-resource  pricing, but also attempted to simu- 
4. "The Energy Emergency,"  The President's  Address to the Nation, November 7, 
1973, in Weekly  Compilation  of Presidenitial  Docuiments,  Vol. 9 (November 12, 1973), 
pp. 1312-22. 
5. It is our belief that economists  should acknowledge  their role as "soft" scientists 
providing  advice to policymakers  regarding  "hard"  decisions. Moreover,  even as soft 
scientists  we do not hesitate  to suggest  that policy  should  aim at (1) protecting  consumers 
from paying more than the normal supply price for essential  goods and services,  and 
(2) encouraging  "Enterprise"  and preventing  "Speculation"  from dominating  economic 
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late how such a pricing system would tend to allocate, over the next 200 
years, the known recoverable energy resources of the world. 
The theoretical foundation for Nordhaus' analysis relies on the theory of 
general economic equilibrium. It assumes 
consumers  with initial  resources  and given  preferences,  and producers  operating 
with well-defined  technical  relations....  [It]  can embrace  many  time periods  and 
uncertainty  about the exact  demand  or supply  conditions;  but it assumes  convex 
production  and preference  sets,  and  that markets  exist  for all goods, services,  and 
contingencies....  [including]  futures  markets  for, say, petroleum  and coal in the 
year 2000; and ...  insurance  markets  for such contingencies  as the failure of 
breeder  processes  to become  economically  viable.  Also, all the costs and benefits 
of a particular  process  of production  must  be internalized  to the decision  maker. 
Under the above conditions  a market  system  will have a general  equilibrium  of 
prices and quantities....  [T]he equilibrium  will be efficient  in the sense that 
there  is no way of improving  the lot of one consumer  without  worsening  the lot 
of another.  Expressed  differently,  the prices  are appropriate  indicators  of social 
scarcity....  6 
Although many economists subscribe to the general-equilibrium  notion 
that market prices can allocate energy resources efficiently  over time, others 
such as F. H. Hahn have noted that the theory of general  economic equilib- 
rium can only be used as an argument against  someone 
...  who maintains  that  we need  not worry  about  exhaustible  resources  because 
they will always  have  prices  which  ensure  their  "proper"  use....  A quick  way of 
disposing  with the claim is to note that an Arrow-Debreu  equilibrium  must be 
an assumption  he is making  for the economy  and  then to show  why the economy 
cannot be in this state. The argument  will here turn on the absence  of futures 
markets  and contingent  futures  markets  and on the inadequate  treatment  of time 
and uncertainty.... This negative  role of Arrow-Debreu  equilibrium  I consider 
almost  to  be  sufficient justification  for  it,  since practical  men and ill-trained 
theorists everywhiere  in the world do not understand what they are claiming... 
when they claim a beneficent  and coherent role fbr the invisible hand.... 
...  [Since]  we  know  that  these  [futures]  markets  are  in fact  very  scarce  [and]  ... 
some  contingent  markets  could  logically  not exist ...  we  can  easily  refiite  proposi- 
tions [like these] on exhaustible resources....  Moreover one can locate precisely 
where  the argument  goes wrong.7 
A  "proper" use  of  any exhaustible resource requires entrepreneurial 
decisions on the time rate of its production. The market price system can 
6. William  D. Nordhaus, "The Allocation of Energy  Resources,"  Brookings  Papers 
on Economic  Activity  (3:1973), pp. 530-31. Hereafter  this document  will be referred  to as 
BPEA, followed by the date. 
7. Frank H. Hahn, On thze  Notion of Equilibrium  in Economics  (London: Cambridge 
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provide guidance on an optimal resource allocation over time only under 
the following conditions: 
1. Well-organized forward markets existfor  each date in the future. 
2.  Consumers know with actuarial certainty all their needs of  energy 
resources at each date. 
3.  Consumers  are able and willing to exercise all these future demands by 
currently entering into forward contractsfor each date. 
4.  Entrepreneurs  know with actuarial certainty the costs of production 
associated with production flowsfor  each date. 
5.  Sellers can choose between an immediate contract at today's market 
price and a forward contract at the market price associated with any future 
delivery date (over 73,000 in the Nordhaus model). 
6.  Entrepreneurs know  with actuarial certainty the  course  of  future 
interest rates. 
7.  The social rate of discount equals the rate at which entrepreneurs 
discount future earnings and costs.8 
8. Nofalse trading  occurs-that  is, no production or exchange ever takes 
place at nonequilibrium prices.9 
If  all  these conditions  are met,  then  in  a  competitive  environment, 
market prices can be shown to be an efficient or socially optimal way to 
allocate energy resources over time, in the sense of maximizing the sum of 
discounted consumer and producer surpluses. 
Since for any particular property, the fossil fuels in  the ground are a 
fixed inventory (or  exhaustible resource), the more  used today,  ceteris 
paribus, the less  will  be  available for  future delivery. Consequently,  a 
8. This condition  can hold only if monetary  and fiscal policy are so precisely  applied 
that they eliminate  any divergence  between  the natural  rate of interest  and the market 
rate of interest.  See Kenneth  J. Arrow, "Discounting  and Public Investment  Criteria," 
in Allen V. Kneese and Stephen  C. Smith  (eds.), Water  Research  (Johns  Hoplins  Press 
for Resources  for the Future, 1966), pp. 13-32. 
9. The absence  of false  trading  is an esoteric  but essential  condition  for the beneficence 
of the invisible  hand.  In the real  world  of uncertainty,  however,  false  trades  are  inevitable 
and hence those who look to market prices  to allocate energy  resources  properly  over 
time are pursuing  a will-o'-the-wisp. 
Currently,  general-equilibrium  theorists utilize the assumption  of a complete set of 
futures  markets  for all contingent  commodities  to eliminate  uncertainty  and false trades 
from their models. This is merely a logical dodge for it requires  that contracts  for all 
contingent  commodities  be entered  into at market-clearing  prices  at the initial  date-that 
is, all possible  human  agreements  for every  contingency  involve prices  that reconcile  all 
plans and expectations  before any production  and exchange occurs anld no additional 
contracts  can be entered  into for the rest of time. 416  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1974 
rational  entrepreneur  will compare  the present  value of expected  profits 
for a forward  contract  sale at each possible  future  date with the profit- 
ability  of selling  that  amount  today.  If profit-maximizing  entrepreneurs  are 
to produce  for current  sale, current  marginal  revenue  must  be expected  to 
cover  not only current  marginal  factor costs associated  with that barrel 
of oil but also the user costs inherent  in all depletable resources-namely, 
the highest  present  value  of marginal  future  profits  given  up by producing 
that  barrel  of oil currently  rather  than in the future.10  Thus, for example, 
Nordhaus  attempts  to simulate  the allocation  arising  from a complete  set 
of spot and  forward  market  prices  assuming  that (1) the 1970  information 
about  supply  availability  and  costs was accurate  and  relevant  for each  time 
period  for the next two centuries,  and (2) energy  demands  over the fore- 
seeable  future  could  be projected  from  the 1929-68  historical  growth  rates 
(ignoring  price  elasticity  effects).11 
As Nordhaus  recognizes,12  forward  markets  for most commodities  do 
not exist and, as Hahn has noted, they cannot logically  exist in the real 
world  where  the future  is yet to be created.  Arrow has attributed  the failure 
10. For a complete discussion of user costs and petroleum production, see  Paul 
Davidson, "Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil Industry," American 
Economic  Review,  Vol. 53 (March 1963), pp. 85-108; also see Robert G.  Kuller and 
Ronald  G. Cummings,  "An Economic Model of Production  and Investment  for Petro- 
leum  Reservoirs,"  American  Economic  Review,  Vol. 64 (March 1974), pp. 66-79. 
As  Champernowne  has indicated, Keynes borrowed the term "user cost"  from 
Marshall,  but was the first  to develop the concept and apply it to the question of inter- 
temporal  production  from depletable  properties.  See D. G. Champernowne,  "Expecta- 
tions and the Links  Between  the Economic  Present  and Future,"  in Robert Lekachman 
(ed.),  Keynes' General Thleory: Reports  of Thzree  Decades  (St.  Martin's,  1964), p.  177; 
and John  Maynard  Keynes,  Thle General Thleory of  Employment,  Interest  and Money 
(Harcourt,  Brace,  1936),  pp. 66-73. Since  then many other  authors  have  refined  the user- 
cost concept  to analyze  entrepreneurial  decisions  about the timing of production  in the 
short  run.  See,  for example,  Joe S. Bain, "Depression  Pricing  and  the Depreciation  Func- 
tion," Quarterly  Journal of Economics, Vol. 51 (August 1937), pp. 705-15;  Alfred C. Neal, 
Industrial Concentration and Price  Inflexibility  (American  Council  on  Public  Affairs, 
1942), pp. 58-61; Sidney Weintraub,  Price Tlheory (Pitman, 1949), pp. 378-81; A. D. 
Scott, "Notes on User Cost," Economic  Journal, Vol. 63 (June 1953), pp. 368-84; 
Anthony  D. Scott, "The  Theory  of the Mine Under Conditions  of Certainty,"  in Mason 
Gaffney  (ed.), Extractive  Resources  and Taxation  (University  of Wisconsin  Press, 1967), 
pp. 34-41; M. Mason Gaffney, "Soil Depletion and Land Rent," Natural Resources 
Journal, Vol. 4 (January 1965), pp. 537-57;  and M. A.  Adelman,  The World Petroleum 
Market  (Johns  Hopkins University  Press  for Resources  for the Future, 1972),  p. 40. 
11. Nordhaus,  "Allocation  of Energy  Resources,"  pp. 537-41. 
12. Ibid., p. 534. Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  417 
of real-world  economies  to develop  forward  markets  in most goods13  to 
the costliness  of enforcing  forward  contracts  to dates far in the future, 
and the unwillingness  of buyers  and sellers  to make forward  contractual 
production  and  purchase  commitments.14  Even  if one  is willing  to overlook 
what  Arrow  terms  the "failure  of markets  for future  goods"  in attempting 
to model an "efficient"  time path that might apply in the presence  of 
futures  markets  (as Nordhaus  does),  the necessary  assumption  that  no false 
trading  occurs dooms the search for an efficient  allocative  mechanism 
that relies  on market  prices.  If false trading  occurs,  the parameters  of the 
economy  change  and  it is extremely  unlikely  that  the original  set of equilib- 
rium spot and forward  prices over time will continue to  provide an 
efficient  solution-or that any other  set can. 
In the past, general-equilibrium  theorists  such as Hicks have avoided 
the  devastating  conclusion  that  economists  cannot  say anything  meaningful 
about  efficient  resource  use over  time  by merely  assuming  that  false  trading 
is negligible.  Hicks  justified  this assumption  by shortening  the time hori- 
zon-to  less than a day if necessary.15  But, then, those who advocate  a 
market-price  solution for allocating  exhaustible  fossil fuels over years, 
decades,  or even  centuries  cannot  use general-equilibrium  theory  to justify 
their  position. 
Many  economists  ignore  these formidable  issues  by developing  models 
for a world of certainty  with a specified  time horizon.  Other  economists 
merely  assert  that  resource  markets  in the  real  world  normally  behave  much 
as they would in a world of certainty,  and that therefore  general-equilib- 
rium  models  are a useful  "parable"  for analyzing  the efficient  time rate of 
exploitation of exhaustible resources. For example, Solow states: ". . . in 
tranquil  conditions,  resource  markets  are likely  to track  their  equilibrium 
paths  moderately  well, or at least not likely  to rush  away  from them.... 
13. Kenneth J. Arrow, "Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis," American 
Economic  Review,  Vol. 64 (March 1974), p. 8. 
14. In fact, however,  long-term  (often perpetual)  leases  are the rule  for properties  that 
bear  natural  resources. 
But many of those who will be buyers in the future may at any given time be yet 
unborn;  or, if already  alive, too young to enter into the contracts  necessary  to convert 
future  wants  into demand,  or uncertain  how much energy  resources  they will need in the 
future. Under these circumstances  a free market system could not allocate energy re- 
sources  over decades  or centuries  to achieve  Pareto efficiency  even if a complete set of 
futures  markets  for all contingent  commodities  existed. 
15. J. R. Hicks, Value  and Capital:  An Inquiry  into Some Fundamental  Principles  of 
Economic  Thleory  (2d ed., Oxford  University  Press, 1946), p. 129. 418  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
[Of course] resource markets may be rather vulnerable to surprises.  . ..  It 
may be quite a while before the transvaluation of values ...  settles down 
under the control of sober future prospects."16 This belief in  "tranquil 
conditions" and the ultimate dominance of  "sober" minds in  the long 
run-in  short, the stability of expectations-is  the bedrock of  the neo- 
classical view that the competitive market may yet, with sufficient  empirical 
study and analysis, yield the secret of  determining the socially  optimal 
exploitation of exhaustible resources over time. 
One of the more ingenious attempts at developing such a scenario for 
energy-resource use over time has  been Nordhaus'  monumental study. 
Nordhaus' work has been described as an analysis of  ". . . how  energy 
requirements  will be met  in the  long  run,  . . . [and  of]  the  pattern  of  uses 
and prices of various types of energy that would emerge through time in a 
free competitive market. While he acknowledges some of the ways in which 
actual prices may differ from those generated by his model, he regards his 
general outline of resource utilization and price changes as helpful indi- 
cators of how the future of energy use is likely to unfold."17  Nordhaus notes 
that in his model "the price system is ex ante efficient as long as a com- 
plete set of futures markets exists."18 He recognizes that the absence of 
these markets might create "serious problems," but he argues that  "an 
estimate of whether current usage is too fast or too slow cannot be made 
a priori; it can emerge only from a carefully constructed econometric and 
engineering model of the economy."19 
Here we must disagree.20  As Shackle has pointed out, "the existence of 
'futures' markets is a mere technical gloss on the essential situation,"'21 
since  speculators enter into  contracts in  futures markets because  they 
disagree with the market's valuation of the future. Hence when the future 
16. Solow, "Economics  of Resources,"  p. 7. In correspondence  regarding  this paper, 
Solow has  indicated  that he accepts  the view that  an optimal  strategy  is a will-o'-the-wisp. 
Nevertheless,  he maintains  that  it is possible  to judge  that some intertemporal  allocations 
are better  or more efficient  than others with a high degree  of probability. 
17. Arthur M. Okun and George L. Perry, "Editors'  Introduction  and Summary," 
BPEA (3:1973), p. 516. 
18. Nordhaus,  "Allocation  of Energy  Resources,"  p. 534. 
19. Ibid., p. 537. 
20. This is not to deny  Nordhaus'  conclusion  about the immense  availability  of fossil 
fuels! And Nordhaus  has described  at least one possible scenario  for the future.  But this 
scenario  has nothing  to do with an optimal path in the real world. 
21.  George L. S. Shackle, Episteinics & Economics: A Critiqle of Economic Doctrines 
(Cambridge,  England:  Cambridge  University  Press, 1972),  p. 1  1  1. Paul Davidson,  Laurence  H. Falk, and  Hoesung  Lee  419 
becomes the present, either the speculators or the market, or both, will 
have been in error and false trading (surprises)  will have occurred. As long 
as the future is uncertain individual opinions about it are free to diverge 
from  each  other and  from the  pronouncements of  any  market. False 
transactions are an  inevitable and ubiquitous phenomenon  in  the  real 
world. 
"[The] long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run 
we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if 
in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long 
past the ocean is flat again."22  Any attempt to provide policymakers with 
guidelines for solving real-world problems such as the energy crisis using 
assumptions of  "a world of certainty" or "values under the control  of 
sober future prospects" or "tranquil conditions," is, in our view, almost 
fruitless, and may be positively mischievous in that it may mislead practical 
men into claiming "a beneficent and coherent role for the invisible hand." 
Because futures markets do  not  exist; because even if they did, false 
trading would occur in a world of uncertainty and change; and because 
estimates of future demands and costs are at best unreliable, it is impossible 
to specify any time rate of exploitation of resources that will be efficient or 
maximize the sum of discounted consumer and producer surpluses over 
any long period. 
The a priori inability of market prices to provide any guideline for such 
allocation does not relieve producers from the responsibility of deciding 
the actual rate for exploiting these resources. Some economists, recognizing 
the  hopelessness of  specifying any policy  for  socially  optimal resource 
management, have argued that "the mere statement of the problem  ... 
serves to support a general disposition to leave these complicated calcula- 
tions to the self-interest of businessmen in competitive markets,"23  in the 
delusive hope that the inevitable errors of many decisionmakers will tend 
to cancel out. In the early sixties, this view was not hard to accept, provided 
the  government assured the  existence of  competitive markets, required 
field unitization, and removed certain favorable tax  treatments. In  the 
midst of a worldwide "energy crisis," leaving energy-resource production 
to businessmen's subjective estimates of user costs seems much less desir- 
22. A Tract  on Monetary  Reform,  Vol. IV, The Collected  Writings  of John Maynard 
Keynes  (London: Macmillan,  1971 ed.), p. 65. 
23. Melvin G. de Chazeau  and Alfred E. Kahn, Integration  anid Competition  in thle 
Petroleum Industry (Yale  University  Press, 1959), p. 236. 420  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
able. Current market conditions are likely to encourage all producers to 
expect rapid increases in  prices (as  a  reflection of  growing monopoly 
elements  rather  than of increasing social value), and such views will nurture 
monopoly  growth with  its  concomitant  redistribution of  income  from 
consumers to producers and ultimately to property owners in the form of 
economic rents. While some may disagree, we judge such a redistribution 
to be undesirable  as well as unnecessary. Accordingly, we now believe that 
in the absence of  omniscient producers or governments, the damage is 
likely to be minimized by the adoption of policies that eliminate positive 
user costs as an element in production decisions. 
USER  COSTS IN  THE  ABSENCE  OF  FORWARD  MARKETS 
In  the  absence  of  developed  futures markets,  producers' subjective 
expectations of the user costs inherent in all raw materials are major deter- 
mining factors in the time rate of exploitation of energy resources. Given 
the time period, as long as the expected rate of increase in the difference 
between price and average factor costs is equal to  the expected rate of 
interest, the marginal user cost is zero, and profit-maximizing managers 
will produce up to  the point  where current price equals the remaining 
marginal factor costs plus  a markup or profit margin whose magnitude 
depends on the degree of monopoly  the producers have in the market- 
place.24  (If producers operated in a purely competitive market, price would 
simply equal marginal factor costs.) 
If,  however, for  the  future, price is  expected to  increase relative to 
production costs at an annual rate beyond the expected rate of interest, 
marginal user costs will be positive and current production will be reduced 
as producers withhold some  energy resources to  sell  at  a  greater "dis- 
counted" profit at a future date. Finally, if prices are expected to decrease 
relative to costs (or to increase at less than the rate of interest), marginal 
user costs will be negative and current production will be higher than when 
marginal user costs are zero. Thus, in a world of uncertainty, we are left 
with a bootstrap theory of the time rate of exploitation of energy resources; 
current expectations of producers play the pivotal role in the absence of 
any "facts" about the future. Consequently, relative stability over time in 
prices and production in energy-resource markets requires that most pro- 
24. The degree  of monopoly power can be measured  by m = (P -  MC)/P, where  P 
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ducers think that tomorrow will not be significantly different from today, 
although it can perhaps accommodate some divergency of views among 
producers. 
If, however, most producers expect that the relation of prices to costs 
will change significantly in an uncertain future, energy-resource markets 
will be dominated by speculative activities. Since solid information about 
that future cannot exist, the result is bound to be detrimental to society. 
"Speculators  may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. 
But the position is serious when enterprise  becomes the bubble on a whirl- 
pool of speculation."25 
Until recently, state and federal governmental policies prevented rapid 
changes in  wellhead prices in  the  United  States. Market  prorationing 
supported by the 1935 federal law, popularly known as the Connally Hot 
Oil Act, which prohibits interstate commerce in oil that was produced in 
violation of state prorationing laws, plus the operation of import quotas, 
effectively  eliminated any positive user costs. At the same time, speculation 
in the international market was restrained by the ability of the "Seven 
Sisters"  (the seven largest international oil-producing companies) to main- 
tain an orderly market. However, most sellers of energy resources have 
been led to expect rapidly rising prices by the events of the early seventies- 
including the relaxation of market-demand  prorationing; the growth of the 
power of the oil cartel, the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC), at the same time that import quotas were being removed; the 
unsettled politics of the Middle East. These events have stimulated specu- 
lative proclivities and consequently retarded current production of fossil 
fuels. 
Current statistics from  the  U.S.  Geological  Survey (USGS)  provide 
strong evidence of speculative withholding of oil production. Completed 
shut-in oil-producible zones26 offshore jumped from 953 in 1971 to  2,996 
in 1972 and 3,054 in 1973, while active oil wells fell from 5,704 to 3,814 
over this period, even though new wells continued  to  be  completed at 
a rate of 300 to 400 per year.27  This jump in shut-ins from 14 percent of 
25. Keynes, General  Theory,  p. 159. 
26. A completed  shut-in  producible  zone is an area  in which  a well has been  drilled  and 
has been determined  by USGS to be capable of producing  in paying  quantities,  but for 
which  a suspension  of production  has been certified  by USGS. There  may be more than 
one producible  zone associated  with a single well. 
27. U.S. Geological  Survey,  Conservation  Division, Outer  Continental  Shelf Statistics 
(June 1974), pp. 29, 34-36. For a further  discussion  of the importance  of the shut-in 
oil producible  capacity,  see the section, "A Final Caveat,"  below. 422  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
producible zones in 1971 to over 44 percent in 1972 does suggest an explicit 
decision by producers to  restrict available production flows. Moreover, 
since producers  can restrict  oil production not only by a complete shut-in of 
oil wells but also by reducing flows from producing wells, shutting in asso- 
ciated gas wells, and slowing down drilling activity on wells nearing com- 
pletion,  and  since the  shut-in statistics cover  only  offshore completed 
oil-producible zones, speculative withholding may be significantly greater 
than these statistics suggest.28 
If this speculation is unwarranted-that  is, if producers' expectations do 
not properly reflect the relative valuation of buyers and the costs of pro- 
ducing energy resources for future use vis-'a-vis  their present use (and in an 
uncertain world there is no reason why they can or should)-then  govern- 
ments  must  act  to  prevent such  profit-maximizing speculative activity 
from harming  today's society. Stability in today's energy markets may be a 
humbler goal than the efficient allocation  of  energy resources over the 
long run but, at least, it is achievable. 
In the current  "energy  crisis" two major factors have spurred  speculative 
excesses in the energy  market. These are the growth of the monopoly power 
of the OPEC cartel, and the development of conglomerate energy com- 
panies. 
OPEC  ANLI USER  COSTS 
OPEC oil has always been sold by producers  who had not only significant 
monopoly  power in product markets, but also, in the past, monopsony 
power  in  the market for  oil-bearing properties. The  existence  of  large 
monopoly rents, as well as the possible withholding of diminishing-return 
rents by monopsonist producers on properties in the OPEC nations, has 
now encouraged the host nations to attempt to capture some of these rents 
28. A recent  Federal  Power  Commission  study of 168 offshore  shut-in  producible  gas 
leases has conservatively  estimated  that these properties  contain proved reserves  of 4.7 
billion mcf (thousand  cubic feet) and an additional  3.3 billion mcf in probable  reserves, 
a total two-and-one-half  times actual offshore  production  in 1973.  A significant  portion 
of these gas reserves  is in wells associated  with producible  quantities  of oil. Over two- 
thirds  of these 168  shut-in  leases  are  more  than  five years  old. The FPC staff  is attempting 
to determine  why rational  producers  would develop  these properties  and then shut them 
in. See U.S. Federal  Power  Commission,  Bureau  of Natural  Gas, Offshore  Investigation: 
Producible  Shut-in  Leases  (First  Phase),  Janiuary  1974  (March  1974),  and Offshore  Investi- 
gation:  Producible  Shut-in  Leases  As of January  1974 (Second  Phase) (July 1974). Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  423 
for themselves.29  As long as the host nations competed with each other to 
grant concessions,  however, they  could  receive the  diminishing-returns 
rents at  best. But once they organized a cartel, the market for  OPEC 
properties became a type of bilateral monopoly situation, where the distri- 
bution of the total economic rents (of both sorts) is not determinate. Thus, 
as a number of  experts have noted,  the dispute between the  operating 
companies and the African and Middle East governments "essentially, in 
economic  terms,  . . . is a question  of  the  division  of economic  rent."30 
As landowners in the Middle East and Africa realized that large eco- 
nomic rents had escaped them because of their acceptance of the original 
concession contracts, they urged the formation of the OPEC cartel as a 
remedy. If, of course, the operating companies were passively to acquiesce 
in giving the landowners  the economic rents that, under the initial contracts, 
had been their own, then, ceteris paribus, the actual degree of monopoly 
in the product market would remain unchanged and so would the price to 
consumers. 
But suppose that  host  nations  are now  attempting to  capture both 
diminishing-returns  rents and the monopoly rents in the product market. 
As Chamberlin  has demonstrated, competition for properties among pro- 
ducers makes landlords the ultimate recipient of all monopoly rents.31 If 
the price elasticity of demand in the product market (that is, the degree of 
monopoly) was unchanged and if producers  were already  profit maximizing 
in the product markets, then consumer prices would not change. In this 
case again, the only effect of the OPEC cartel would be to redistribute  the 
largesse of economic rents from the companies to the host nations.32 
If, however, some unexploited monopoly power remains in the product 
market, the companies can attempt to recoup the higher payments to land- 
owners from the ultimate consumers. Their success will depend on  the 
29. In a perfectly  competitive  property  market,  the present  value of lease bonuses  and 
future  royalties  would exactly equal the discounted  values of these economic rents so 
that all diminishing-return  rents would accrue to property owners. If producers  had 
monopsonistic  power either because  of superior  information  or collusion on bids, they 
could keep some of these economic rents. 
30.  Michael  V. Posner,  Fuel Policy:  A Study  in Applied Economics  (London:  Mac- 
millan, 1973),  p. 52. 
31.  Edward H. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monzopolistic  Competition: A Re-orienltation 
of the Theory  of Value  (7th ed., Harvard  University  Press, 1960), pp. 266-69. 
32. This result still might cause balance-of-payments  problems for the consuming 
nations, but as long as the OPEC nations are attempting  merely to capture existing 
economic  rents,  their  actions will not affect long-run  marginal  factor costs. 424  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
price elasticity of demand of the consuming nations for OPEC oil.33 As 
long as either this demand is relatively inelastic, or additional monopoly 
power can be brought to bear,34  the operating  companies will have a strong 
incentive to  extract from consumers the net revenues lost  in monopoly 
rents to the host governments. In fact, as the host nations have increased 
their receipts per barrel, the  operating companies have raised product 
prices by an even greater absolute amount. For example, when the Persian 
Gulf nations raised their payments by the equivalent of 28 cents per barrel 
in February 1971, the matching price increase in Britain was 42 cents per 
barrel;35  thus the net revenues of the operating companies increased as they 
drew on previously unexploited monopoly power. 
The incentive to form a coalition to limit supply and to  convince the 
consuming nations that there is an energy crisis can be analyzed via the 
user cost inherent in all raw materials that involve these kinds of latent 
market power. If at or near current price levels the consumer has no good 
substitute from suppliers who have no economic interest in maintaining 
the potential monopoly rents for OPEC oil, and if governments of con- 
suming nations leave the market unfettered, then the demand for OPEC oil 
will provide the possibility of additional exploitable monopoly  rents. If 
OPEC oil suppliers-whether  host nations or operating  companies-believe 
that, by enforcing market sharing and production restrictions, a cartel can 
exploit additional market power by raising the prices to  the consuming 
nations over time, then the marginal user cost is positive. Hence producers 
and landowners (who  via royalties and taxes have  a vested interest in 
higher prices) will pursue policies to restrict current production as long as 
incremental revenues are exceeded by  incremental costs,  including this 
33. The elasticity of demand for OPEC oil will depend on the availability  of sub- 
stitutes  provided  by suppliers  who have no interest  in maintaining  economic rents for 
OPEC  oil. This point is developed  below. 
34. In a world of perfect  certainty,  profit-maximizing  entrepreneurs  would not leave 
monopoly power unexploited.  In the real world, however,  producers  in the oil industry 
may be more interested  in maintaining  market  shares  than in maximizing  profits. Pro- 
ducers  may not always  set profit-maximizing  prices  for fear of antitrust  or other  govern- 
mental  action. In the absence  of significant  justifications  for increases,  prices  may remain 
stable below profit-maximizing  levels until they are released  by severe market shocks, 
like the closing of the Suez Canal or the unified  demands  of OPEC.  Then, in a world of 
uncertainty,  where  political crises  can reduce  the effectiveness  of government  responses 
to price  increases  produLcers  may  exploit  latent  monopoly  power  and also try to stimulate 
political  and expectational  conditions  that create additional  monopoly power. 
35. The data on  price increases are from the McGraw-Hill publication, Platt's 
Oilgrarn  Newvs  Service,  Vol. 49 (February  18, 1971),  p. 2, and (February  23, 1971),  p. 1-A. Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  425 
positive user cost, as they attempt to capture potential additional monopoly 
rents from consumers. The consumer must then either find a way to reduce 
the user costs to zero or else accept the higher price as tribute to the monop- 
oly power of the suppliers. 
CONGLOMERATE ENERGY  COMPANIES  AND  USER  COSTS 
How  has the growth of  conglomerate energy companies affected the 
ability of the OPEC cartel to create positive user costs? 
As has already  been intimated, the existence of an exploitable monopoly 
position depends on the present and future price elasticity of demand in the 
relevant  range. As far as the OPEC cartel is concerned, therefore, it depends 
in large  measure on the current  price in consuming countries and ultimately 
on the supply price at which alternative sources of energy will become 
significant substitutes for OPEC oil. Suppose, however, the supplier of a 
substitute energy source also has an economic interest in OPEC petroleum 
reserves, because it  is  a conglomerate energy company with an OPEC 
concession or other oil reserves. Then it will anticipate a positive user cost 
in providing  the substitute if production of this substitute reduces potential 
profits from its oil reserves. This positive user cost will raise the supply 
price (above resource costs) of marketing the substitute. 
In these circumstances  this positive user cost of substitutes internalizes a 
cost that in a competitive economy would be external to an independent 
producer of a substitute energy source. Independent producers of domestic 
oil, shale, tar sands, coal, uranium, and so on, would not care if they in- 
flicted capital losses on the value of foreign underground reserves of petro- 
leum by  providing a  cheaper energy source.  Most  reasonable people 
would argue that society is the beneficiary of a decision to produce a less 
expensive substitute even though the oil producers and property owners 
would suffer a capital loss. The existence of rational, multisource, energy- 
producing conglomerates, however, constrains production  of  substitute 
fuels and reduces consumer welfare. The ability of conglomerates to main- 
tain high prices for the substitutes tends to reinforce their monopoly power 
in marketing their OPEC oil. 
If at the current price consumer demand for OPEC oil is therefore still 
in the exploitable range, a strong cartel of  property owners can  allow 
multinational energy conglomerates to continue to raise prices relative to 
real resource costs.  The  continuous  revenue increases of  host  nations 
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OPEC oil  becomes  so  elastic that  monopoly  rents are fully exploited. 
(However, for any given demand situation with any degree of elasticity, 
higher prices require production  restrictions, and  hence  at  least  tacit 
market-sharing  arrangements to  prevent one member of the cartel from 
increasing  its gains at the expense of others.) Since the operating companies 
also have vested interests in the price of OPEC reserves as long as they 
retain any monopoly rents, they will be willing tools  in maintaining an 
"orderly" production market. 
If, however, the operating companies expected the host nation to nation- 
alize the reservoirs  soon without adequate compensation for their economic 
interests, the user costs of OPEC reserves would become negative to the 
producingfirms,  and they would try to increase the production flow even if 
that would drive down current prices to resource costs and destroy their 
market power. Thus, threats of  nationalization without adequate com- 
pensation can only be detrimental to the interests of  host nations, while 
favoring consuming nations. 
POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  OF  USER  COSTS 
In the light of recent experience, OPEC nations seem likely to pursue 
their attempts to capture more of the monopoly rents, and the companies 
their efforts to  exercise all the available monopoly  power in consumer- 
nation  markets. Furthermore, even  if  no  additional  monopoly  power 
remains to be exploited in the consuming nations but if the OPEC cartel is 
intact, monopoly rents will be redistributed  from the operating companies 
(which are basically residents of the consuming nations) toward the OPEC 
nations,  causing  balance-of-payments  problems  and  perhaps  adverse 
changes in the terms of trade among the consuming nations.36 In such an 
ultimate situation, the operating companies would act as monopoly  tax 
collectors for OPEC as all the monopoly rents are transferred  to the host 
nations.37 
Since expectations of price-cost relations can, via the user cost inherent 
in all depletable resources, dictate the rate at which OPEC exploits its large 
36. The loss in real  income  of the consuming  nations  resulting  from  this redistribution 
may take the form of high unemployment  if the OPEC  nations do not spend all of their 
claims on world  income,  and if the governments  of the developed  nations do not under- 
take compensating  expansionary  policies. 
37. See Adelman, World  Petroleum  Market,  p. 256. Paul Davidson,  Laurence  H. Falk,  and  Hoesung  Lee  427 
underground  reserves  in its search  for maximum  economic  rents,  user-cost 
expectations  become  crucial  to the apparent  worldwide  energy  crisis.  The 
OPEC strategy  on user costs depends  on OPEC's  view of the growth  in 
demand  of the consuming  nations,  and its estimates  of the timetable  and 
prices  at which  known  and potential  substitutes  can be marketed. 
User costs cut both ways-that is, expectations  of higher  prices  tend  to 
retard current  exploitation  of known OPEC reservoirs  and exacerbate 
supply  shortages,  while  expectations  of lower  prices  will  accelerate  exploita- 
tion. In other  words,  if the OPEC  countries  expected  the price of oil to 
decline  over  the next  dozen  years,  they  would  want  to augment  the flow of 
oil now to take advantage  of the higher  prices available  today and to- 
morrow.  Hence  the best interests  of the consuming  nations  lie in policies 
that  encourage  the expectation  of a decline  in the price  of OPEC  crude  by, 
say, 1980. 
Accordingly,  consuming  nations  should  devise  policies  aimed  at reducing 
the degree of monopoly in the energy-products  market, or at least at 
containing  it; and  at breaking  up the OPEC  cartel  to prevent  redistribution 
of economic  rents  and the worsening  of the terms  of trade. 
A policy for  substitutes and curbing monopoly power. For  consuming 
countries  such  as the United  Kingdom,  the United  States,  Western  Europe, 
and  Japan,  the  availability  of substitutes  rests  on indigenous  energy  sources 
with low resource  costs or importation  of oil from low-cost,  non-OPEC, 
regions. 
Large  additional  reserves  are  unlikely  to be available  in the next decade 
from non-OPEC  nations  that are not themselves  major  consumers;  and 
even if they were,  such host nations  would probably  find their own self- 
interest  more  compatible  with  joining  OPEC  than  with  attempting  to lick it 
by underpricing  its oil. Moreover,  OPEC  would  probably  see that its self- 
interest  was best served  by accommodating  these countries  and sharing 
the fruits  of the  cartel  with  them.  Hence  the consuming  nations  are  unlikely 
to find  cheap  substitutes  for OPEC  oil among  other  Third  World  countries. 
Thus the major  substitutes  are oil and gas and other  energy  resources 
from properties  within  the boundaries  of consuming  nations or the ad- 
jacent  continental  shelf.  Moreover,  these  substitutes  should  be developed  by 
independent  producers  who have no vested interest  in maintaining  or 
improving  the capitalized  value  of already  proved  oil reserves. 
Accordingly,  consumer  nations  such as the United States  who happen 
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properties within their national boundaries38 should adopt policies that 
accelerate leasing of  offshore tracts and shale lands, and that promote 
development of the properties by independent producers and government 
energy corporations.39  Such policies would reduce the existing degree of 
monopoly  in  product markets  and  permit  some  intramarginal lands 
(which are being withheld by government edict) to  be developed before 
forcing producers  to move further  out along the extensive margin. Further, 
requirements  for rapid development and exploitation would diminish the 
ability of producers  to maintain monopoly power in the product market by 
limiting production. 
Increasing rates of exploitation of new reservoirs. If large new fields in 
consuming countries are currently coming on stream-for  example, in the 
North Sea and Alaska-an  announced policy of rapid exploitation, even 
at rates that exceed the maximum efficient  rate of production (MER),40  will 
induce expectations of a decline in the price for OPEC oil. These expecta- 
tions will be strengthened  if an available substitute, such as shale or nuclear 
38. The USGS estimates  that the lower forty-eight  states  contain between  575 billion 
and 2.4 trillion  barrels  of oil reserves,  while current  proved  reserves  are only 37 billion 
barrels.  See Sanford  Rose, "Our Vast, Hidden Oil Resources,"  Fortune,  Vol. 89 (April 
1974),  pp. 104-05. T. H. McColloh  has reported  that econlomically recoverable  (at 1970- 
71 wellhead  prices)  oil reserves  in the United States are from about three-and-one-half 
to ten times  current  proved  reserves  as reported  by the industry.  See Unzited  States  Minzeral 
Resources,  USGS Professional  Paper 20 (1973), pp. 491, 492. Since these two sets of 
estimates  were made when wellhead prices  were much lower, they significantly  under- 
estimate  current  economically  recoverable  reserves. 
39. A change in the base contract from the constant-percentage  royalty and front- 
loaded bonus should be undertaken  to aid the smaller, independent,  producers.  For 
example,  a bonus-variable  royalty  system  under  which the total bonus (plus accrued  in- 
terest)  would be paid on a schedule  of annual payments  out of sales receipts  after the 
property  is on stream  would virtually  eliminate  the producers'  flow-of-funds  problem  for 
financing  property  acquisitions.  (If the property  was abandoned  before the total bonus 
bid was paid off, the producer  would be liable for the remaining  sum.) 
40. MER is defined  as the highest  rate of production  that can be sustained  over  a long 
period of time without reservoir  damage or significant  loss of ultimate oil and gas 
recovery.  To the extent that there is a positive marginal  user cost associated  with any 
rate of flow that exceeds  MER (see Davidson, "Public  Policy Problems,"  pp. 91-94), a 
subsidy  may  have  to be paid on oil produced  in excess  of MER  in new  fields  that are  under 
private  corporate  management.  If the expected  gain  to the consuming  nations  in breaking 
the OPEC  cartel and receiving  their oil at a price closer to real resource  costs exceeds 
this subsidy,  such a policy would be desirable. 
Some petroleum  engineers  claim  that free  (that  is, not injected)  gas saturation,  which  is 
created  by fast production  rates,  actually  enhances  ultimate  recovery  from  water-drive  or 
water-flood  mechanisms  so that  no case  can be made  for a loss of oil caused  by production 
rates  above MER. See Rose, "Our Vast, Hidden Oil Resources,"  pp. 106, 182. Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  429 
power, is to be independently supplied in the foreseeable future. Once any 
OPEC member appreciates this eventuality, the cartel will begin to  dis- 
integrate and the increased production flow from indigenous fields com- 
peting with OPEC will tend to reduce monopoly power and increase supply. 
POLICY  CONCLUSIONS 
In sum, the adoption by consuming nations of policies that promise to 
force down net demand prices for OPEC oil in the foreseeable future, but 
appear to  permit host  nations  to  capture some  large monopoly  rents 
currently, can have beneficial results for consuming nations.  They will 
unleash economic forces that will encourage the break-up of the OPEC 
cartel, spur current  production, and exert downward pressure on estimates 
of user cost. An essential condition for the success of this approach is the 
existence of an alternative energy source whose suppliers have no vested 
interest in maintaining the value of OPEC or other oil reserves. Thus, for 
example, if the development of the shale oil industry or the operation of the 
indigenous petroleum or coal industries in the United States is entrusted to 
conglomerate energy companies that have producing interests in OPEC or 
other oil reserves,  the success of any attempt to provide a substitute, com- 
petitively priced, energy source will be seriously jeopardized. Accordingly, 
a  vigorous domestic  antitrust policy  to  dissolve  conglomerate  "energy 
companies" into independent domestic and foreign companies dealing with 
only one energy resource is an essential element in a national energy policy. 
Any policy that is expected to reduce monopoly power in the product 
market over time will create negative user costs  and accelerate current 
production  and  hence  ease  the  energy  crisis. Thus  vigorous  antitrust 
policies and consuming-government regulation of, or participation in, the 
operations of producing companies can, alone or in combination, force the 
producers to accept a more competitive return on their investment, and 
thereby eliminate monopoly  rents and provide consumers with  fuels at 
lower prices. 
Market Price for Self-Sufficiency  in Oil in 1980 
This section presents estimates of the long-run market-clearing prices 
for oil that would be consistent with U.S. self-sufficiency  in 1980. 430  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
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Source:  See  text  for  detailed  explanation. 
a.  D,  P,  Q  =  demand,  price,  and  U.S.  production,  respectively 
0, n  =  subscripts  indicating  1971  and  1980,  respectively 
Un  =  U.S.  demand in 1980 at 1971 price 
S  =  long-run  supply. 
Figure 1 represents the basic model. Given the degree of monopoly in 
the petroleum industry, the curve S represents the supply path for crude 
oil for the United States in the long run (where user costs are zero);41  Do is 
the U.S.  demand curve for oil net of imports in the base period,  1971. 
41. In what follows we use the phrase "long-run  supply path" merely to denote a 
supply curve in which user costs are zero and the only components  of the flow-supply 
price  are Keynes'  prime  and supplementary  factor  costs including  any historical  monop- 
oly rents. (See Keynes, General  Theory,  pp. 23-24, 67-68.) Our long-run supply price 
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Accordingly,  Qo  is U.S. production  in the base period,  P0 is the domestic 
crude  price  in the  base  period,  U.S. consumption  would  be Qo  plus  imports 
(MO)  in the base period,  and U, represents  the estimated  total quantity  of 
crude  oil that  would  be demanded  in the United  States  in 1980,  at the base 
period  price.  This quantity  lies on the 1980  total U.S. demand  curve,  Dn, 
which  is assumed  to have  the same  (constant)  price  elasticity  as the base- 
period demand  curve, Do. Hence, in Figure 1, Pn represents  the 1980 
market-clearing  price for full self-sufficiency-that  is, meeting all U.S. 
demand  for crude  oil from  U.S. production,  Q(,. 
We have explored  three variations  on this basic model. They assume 
(1) that some  given  quantity  of imports  from  what  we term  "friendly"  oil- 
producing  nations,  such as Canada  and Venezuela,  will be available  to 
meet  some  part  of U.S. demand  in 1980;  (2) that other  energy  sources  will 
become more important  relative  to oil in supplying  U.S. needs in 1980; 
and (3) that the degree  of monopoly  in the crude  oil-producing  industry 
will be zero-that is, market  price  will  just equal  long-run  marginal  factor 
costs. In applying  the basic long-run  supply  model, we assume  that the 
time  between  now and 1980  is sufficient  to obtain  the increased  production 
associated  with Qn  on our long-run  supply path. In the final section 
below, we suggest  why we think  that, given  proper  governmental  actions, 
there is no technical  constraint  on achieving  the necessary  adjustment 
in production  by 1980. 
The following  sections  present  the formal  analysis  of the calculations 
made and the data base used for the empirical  estimates  of prices and 
production  quantities  underlying  self-sufficiency  in 1980. Included  is an 
analysis  of the sensitivity  of our 1980  price  estimates  to reasonable  varia- 
tions in the elasticities  of supply  and demand  to price. 
THE  ANALYTICAL  MODELS 
Full self-sufficiency. Assuming  constant  price  elasticities  for both supply 
and demand,  the supply  equation  is specified  as Q =  aPb, where  b is the 
(including  finding  and development  costs). Consequently,  at any point of time the supply 
prices of remaining  reserves  exceed  zero only to the extent  that they embody  capitalized 
past finding  and developing  costs that have not yet been paid for out of sales revenues. 
In adopting this view we are emphasizing  the important  economic difference  between 
finding  what exists  and creating  something  new. Nature,  not man, produced  mineral  de- 
posits and Nature's  long-run  supply  price  is zero. In the long run only finding,  develop- 
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long-run supply price elasticity and a is an arbitrary constant; and the 
demand equation is Q =  aP-,  where A is the constant price elasticity of 
demand and ae  is an arbitrary  constant.42  Then the equilibrium price is the 
one  that  satisfies the  condition  aPb=  aP-0.  The  1980 market-clearing 
price, Pn, as shown in Figure 1, is computed as43 
(1)  Pn=e 
where 
(Ila)  ;  In U.  -  In Qo +  (b +  13)  ln Po 
The quantity produced in 1980, Qn  in Figure 1, is obtained by substitut- 
ing equation (1) into the supply equation to yield 
(2)  Qn=  e+, 
where 
(2a)  X=ln  Qo-bl:nPo  +  bInPn. 
Allowing  for  some imports or substitution. If imports form part of the 
supply in 1980, the market price will be lower than that computed under the 
assumption of full self-sufficiency. We have analyzed the simplest case by 
assuming that the ratio of imports to domestically produced crude oil will 
remain unchanged from the base period, so that the market-clearing  price 
is adjusted downward by replacing Qo in equation (la)  with (Qo +  MO), 
where Mo is  the  quantity of  crude oil  imported from  specific friendly 
countries during the base period: 
(3)  Pn =  eo, 
where 
(3a)  0=  In Un -  ln (Qo +  Mo) +  (b +  A)  lnPo 
Similarly, if, say, indigenous coal becomes an important substitute for 
crude oil, then in equations (la)  and (2a), U, is reduced by the amount of 
additional coal used in the nth year, and the system is then solved as in the 
basic case. 
42. The supply  equation  is obtained  by solving  the differential  equation 
b = (dQ/dP)(P/Q), 
where  b is the constant  price  elasticity.  A similar  procedure  yields the demand  equation. 
43. Derivation  available  from the authors  upon request. Paul Davidson,  Laurence  H. Falk, and  Hoesung  Lee  433 
Zero degree of monopoly. The degree of monopoly power, m, exercised 
by producers  in any market  can be measured  by m =  (P  -  MC)/P,  where 
P is product price and MC is marginal resource costs.  Such a measure 
implies a markup over marginal costs of 
1  -1. 
This markup  is compatible with either profit maximization (in which case m 
is equal to the reciprocal  of the price elasticity of demand at the point where 
price and output maximize profit) or with a conventional markup over 
marginal resource costs in a world of uncertainty where profit maximiza- 
tion may be elusive. 
As long as the degree of monopoly is the same at each level of production, 
it can be shown that the elasticity of a supply function under an unchanging 
degree of monopoly44  is equal to the elasticity of the comparable competi- 
tive supply function, MC.45  With S(mrn)  representing supply under a given 
degree of monopoly, Figure 2 depicts a family of long-run supply paths, 
exemplified  by S(mo), S(mr), and S(m2), where S(mo)  represents  the supply 
curve when the degree of monopoly is zero, and the others represent  long- 
run supply paths associated with different degrees of monopoly. If in the 
base period the degree of monopoly was Mn2,  then in Figure 2 (as in Figure 1) 
P0  and  Qo represent the  base  price  and  quantity,  respectively, while 
PO(mo)  represents  the base-period price for that level of output in the total 
absence of monopoly. Thus, if the degree of monopoly in 1980 remains  M2, 
the 1980 self-sufficiency  price and quantity are Pn  and Qn  in Figure 2 (the 
same solution as in Figure  1). If, however, the  degree of  monopoly  is 
reduced to zero in 1980, then by definition the 1980 self-sufficiency price 
would be less than Pn. In fact, under these assumptions, solution of equa- 
tions (la)  and (2a) of the basic model gives 1980 prices, Pj(mo), below P, 
the 1980 self-sufficiency  price of our basic model. That result provides good 
reason for (1) vigorous antitrust action, or (2) some form of government 
44. Economic  textbooks  often claim that there  is no supply function with monopoly 
in the product  market;  for example,  see George  J. Stigler,  Thle  Th7eory  of Price (3rd ed., 
Macmillan,  1966),  pp. 212-13. In fact, a supply  function  can be specified  only when the 
degree  of monopoly  is determined-that is, the supply  curve  is always derived  for alter- 
native  expected  demand  curves.  It is only the assumption  of a zero degree  of monopoly 
that permits  the textbooks  to derive  the marginal  cost curve  as the supply  function  in the 
purely  competitive  case. Given the cost function, the degree of monopoly, and entre- 
preneurial  behavior,  a supply  path can always be derived. 
45. A proof is available  upon request  from the authors. 434  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Figure 2.  U.S. Supply and Demand for Crude Oil, with Different 
Degrees of Monopoly, 1971 and 1980a 
Price 
S(m2) 
P  S(mi) 
S(Mo) 
Qo  Qn.  Qn(MO)  Un 
Quantity 
Source: See text for detailed explanation. 
a. mx =  degree of monopoly (for example, mo represents  a zero degree). 
Other symbols are as defined  for Figure 1. 
regulation, or (3) a government corporation-or  some combination of the 
three-to  foster a reduction in the degree of monopoly in the industry.46 
We discuss these alternatives below. 
Estimates of Prices, Quantities, aiid Elasticities for the Model 
Estimation of  1980 prices and production under self-sufficiency  requires 
data on, first, the wellhead price and U.S.  production in the base period 
46. Senator  Adlai E. Stevenson  III has suggested  that a Federal  Oil and Gas Corpora- 
tion (FOGCO) be created to explore for, develop,  and produce  oil and gas on lands 
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(P0 and Q0);  second,  the 1980  quantity  of crude  oil that  would  be demanded 
at the base-year  price, U.; and third,  the price  elasticities  of demand  and 
supply. 
BASE-PERIOD  PRICE  AND  QUANTITY 
In 1971  domestic  crude  oil production  was near "capacity"  as market- 
demand  prorationing  restrictions  became  less constraining.  Since  the end 
of 1971  domestic  crude-oil  prices  have been under  government  controls. 
We have, therefore,  taken the average  1971 welihead  price of $3.35 per 
barrel and 1971 domestic  production  of 9.5 million barrels  per day as 
base-period  magnitudes  lying  on the  long-run  supply  path,  S, in Figure  1.47 
In essence  we are assuming  (1) that statistics  for the years  prior to 1971 
may not lie on the long-run  supply path because of prorationing  pro- 
duction restrictions;  and (2) that prices and production  statistics  since 
1971  are  likely  to reflect  temporary  government  controls  and positive  user 
costs generated  by the increasing  strength  of the OPEC cartel and the 
disruption  of the Middle East War, so that data since 1971 are likely 
to lie above  the long-run  supply  curve. 
QUANTITY  DEMANDED  IN  1980 
For the quantity  of crude  oil that would be demanded  in 1980 at the 
base-period  price,  we have  taken  the projection  of the National  Petroleum 
Council.  NPC estimates  an increase  in total domestic  oil demand  from  14.7 
million  barrels  per  day in 1970  (including  all imports  of crude  and refined 
products)  to 22.3  million  barrels  per  day  in 1980,  or 4.25  percent  per  year.48 
To obtain  net demand  for crude  oil from  the NPC statistics,  we subtracted 
the production  of  natural-gas  liquids of  1.7 million barrels per day 
47. Price  statistics  from World  Oil, Vol. 174  (February  15, 1972),  p. 21; quantity  statis- 
tics from Oil and  Gas  Journal,  Vol. 70 (January  31, 1972),  p. 87. The latter source  (p. 93) 
was also used for base-period  import  statistics  from  Canada  and Venezuela  in our model 
assuming  imports  from friendly  nations. 
48. National Petroleum  Council, U.S. Energy Outlook:  An Initial Appraisal,  1971- 
1985  (1971),  Vol. 2, p. 15.  The projection  assumed  that the economic  environment  would 
remain  unchanged  throughout  the period  1971-85. Hence it appears  to be equivalent  to 
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(MMB/d)  in  1970. We estimated that production of natural-gas liquids 
will increase  by 2.2 percent a year over the decade and therefore subtracted 
2.1 MMB/d  from the NPC  projection of  total  demand to  obtain  20.2 
MMB/d in 1980 as our estimate of Un. 
ELASTICITY ESTIMATES 
Supply elasticity. Despite the intensive study of the petroleum industry 
by economists over the years, there is a paucity of estimates of supply elas- 
ticities for crude oil. Since this is a vertically integrated industry, reliable 
data on the response, at the wellhead, of supply to the market price is ex- 
tremely difficult to  obtain. Moreover, the technology of  oil production, 
which involves a long gestation period between well drilling and production 
flows, makes it extremely difficult empirically to relate changes in market 
prices at given points in time with the flow-supply responses over time. 
Because we believe these formidable problems make direct estimate  of 
supply elasticities of crude oil difficult, if not impossible, we attempted in 
an earlier  paper to estimate the supply elasticity indirectly, using the theory 
of economic rents.49 
49. Paul Davidson, Laurence  Falk, and Hoesung Lee, "The Relations of Economic 
Rents and Price Incentives  to Oil and Gas Supplies,"  in G. Brannon  (ed.), Studies in 
Energy Tax Policy (Ballinger,  1974), pp. 115-55. 
Some may believe  that a stock-supply  elasticity  of additions  to reserves  rather  than a 
flow-supply  elasticity  of oil production  is relevant.  We disagree  for a number  of reasons. 
Since proved reserves  are merely "shelf inventory" for  oil producers,  the reserve 
elasticity  would be a good proxy  for the relevant  Marshallian  production-flow  elasticity 
if it is assumed  that shelf  inventory  is continuously  maintained  as a constant proportion 
to sales. But Project  Independence  is a production-flow  goal and not a shelf-inventory 
goal, and a constant reserves-production  ratio in oil is no more necessary  than is an 
unchanging  inventory-sales  ratio in other economic activities; therefore,  a reserve  elas- 
ticity  estimate  is not the most relevant  concept.  Certainly  no particular  level of reserves  is 
necessary  for 1980. 
Moreover,  actual changes in the ratio of reserves  to production  flows will reflect 
(1) changes  in the interest  rate;  (2) changes  in user  cost; (3) the technological  fact that ad- 
ditions  to reserves  are  lumpy; and (4) changes  in wellhead  prices  and  costs. Therefore,  an 
empirical  reserve  elasticity  based  on past data  is unlikely  to reflect  accurately  the produc- 
tion-flow  elasticity.  Finally, statistics  on proved  reserves  as reported  by the industry  are 
more likely to be biased and unreliable  than production  statistics,  and hence any em- 
pirical  estimates  of reserve  elasticity  are less reliable  than a production-flow  elasticity. Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  437 
Using the "as if" methodology of positive economics,50 then, for any 
given degree of monopoly, we can estimate the supply elasticity in terms 
of payments to landowners (economic rents) as 
(4)  E8= 
where Es is the long-run elasticity of supply and a is the proportion of the 
value of shipments  that is paid to property owners.51  Thus, the greater  is a, 
the less elastic is the supply of petroleum.52  If, for example, supply were 
almost perfectly elastic, payments to landowners would be insignificant, a 
would be negligible, and Es would approach infinity. If, on the other hand, 
supply were very inelastic, payments to landowners would envelop most of 
the value of shipments, a would be very large, and Es would approach zero. 
Using data from the U.S.  Department of the Interior on  payments to 
property  owners and the value of shipments for petroleum properties on the 
U.S. continental shelf, we estimated that Es was approximately 1.4 for the 
years 1953-71  and 1.6 for 1971, and projected it at approximately 1.8 by 
1980. Since we believe that most additional U.S. production will come from 
offshore properties, we prefer the 1971 base-year Es of 1.6. In Tables 1-4, 
however, we also show the differences  involved in using plausible estimates 
on either side of 1.6. 
Demand elasticity.  Both the income and price elasticities of demand are 
relevant to our 1980 estimates of demand. The NPC projection involved a 
4.25 percent annual growth in demand (at the base-period price) in con- 
junction with a 3.9 percent annual growth in GNP. Thus the NPC forecast, 
which we used, implicitly assumed an income elasticity of 1.1. 
50. For a discussion  of this approach  see Milton Friedman,  Essays in Positive  Eco- 
nomics  (University  of Chicago  Press, 1953; fifth impression,  1966),  Pt. 1. 
51. For any given property  at any given time the marginal  cost schedule of annual 
production  flows  might be expected to shift upward over time (unless offset by produc- 
tivity gains). Since each producer  considers these expectations  of changing costs and 
productivity  gains  over  the life of the property  when  he enters  into a lease contract,  a will 
reflect  them. Hence our supply  elasticity  reflects  the expected  "average"  elasticity  of the 
marginal  costs of production  flows over the life of each property.  While the "average" 
elasticity  in the aggregate  can change over time, it is not likely to change drastically 
over a decade,  since it is tied to the average  life of properties,  which normally  exceeds 
two decades. 
52. In "Relations  of Economic  Rents,"  we discuss  at length  some of the limitations  of 
this measure.  Nevertheless,  we believe that this approach does provide a "ballpark" 
supply  estimate  for others  to discuss  or even shoot at. 438  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Studies of the price elasticity of demand (Ed) have usually suggested a 
value in the inelastic range. The Cabinet Task Force used an estimate of 
0.1, which Standard Oil Company (N.J.)  provided, but its report gave 
no  documentary support for this elasticity.53 A  study by  Burrows and 
Domencich reported a higher, but still inelastic, price elasticity of 0.5.54 
In most of the following discussion of our estimates of the price and pro- 
duction outcomes in 1980, we use E8 =  1.6 and Ed =  0.5 as, in our view, 
the most reasonable values. 
Empirical  Results 
The results of our analysis are summarized in Tables 1 through 4. All 
prices in the tables are expressed in terms of 1974 dollars: hence, the well- 
head price in the 1971 base period in 1974 dollars is $3.74-compared  with 
the actual 1971 price of $3.35.55  All quantities are reported in millions of 
barrels per day. 
Table  1 summarizes the market-clearing prices and quantities for full 
self-sufficiency in 1980-that  is, no reliance on imports-at  various elas- 
ticities. Taking 1.6 and 0.5 as the most reasonable elasticities for supply 
and demand, respectively, the market-clearing price would be  $5.36 (in 
1974 dollars) and the quantity supplied would be 16.9 MMB/d.  If E8 was 
as low as 1.4 and Ed was as low as 0.1, the price at full self-sufficiency, 
given the degree of monopoly, might be as high as $6.19 per barrel, while 
19.2 MMB/d  would be produced. Table 1 also presents price and produc- 
tion estimates for other elasticities.56 
53. Cabinet  Task Force on Oil Import Control, The Oil Import  Question,  A Report 
on the Relationship  of Oil Imports  to the National Security  (U.S. Government  Printing 
Office,  1970),  p. 226. 
54. See  James  C. Burrows  and  Thomas  A. Domencich,  An  Analysis  of the United  States 
Oil Import  Quota  (Heath-Lexington,  1970), pp. 106, 119-29. The negative signs of Ed 
are omitted  throughout. 
55. The price  adjustment  is made by first  removing  the fuel-price  component  from  the 
GNP implicit  price  deflator  for both periods,  and then extrapolating  the 1971  welihead 
price to 1974 dollars,  in proportion  to the change in corrected  GNP deflators  between 
the two periods. 
56. Spann and his associates  have estimated  a supply elasticity of 0.9, which is re- 
flected  in the first  row of the table. Since their model utilizes a Cobb-Douglas  function 
with production  as the dependent  variable,  it can be shown that their supply-elasticity 
formula  is comparable  to ours.  According  to note 17 of their  paper  (p. 1320), the sum of Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  439 
Table 1.  Estimates of Market Price and Quantity for Full U.S. 
Self-Sufficiency  in Oil in 1980, by Selected Elasticities 
Prices  in 1974 dollars;  quantities  in millions of barrels  per day 
Elasticity  of demand 
0.08  0.1  0.5a  1.0 
Elasticity 
of supply  Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity 
0.9  8.08  19.0  7.96  18.7  6.42  15.4  5.57  13.6 
1.4  6.23  19.4  6.19  19.2  5.57  16.6  5.13  14.8 
1.6a  5.87  19.5  5.84  19.3  5.36  16.9  5.00  15.1 
1.8  5.59  19.6  5.57  19.4  5.20  17.1  4.90  15.4 
2.0  5.38  19.6  5.36  19.5  5.06  17.4  4.81  15.7 
Sources: Authors' model discussed in the text, where the sources of the basic data are also given. 
a.  Authors' preferred  estimate. 
Figure 3 can be used to interpret the results in Table 1. The S curve is 
the long-run supply path; Do, Dc, and Dn are the demand curves in the 1971 
base period, the current  period, and 1980, respectively;  P0 is the 1971 price 
of $3.74; Qo is the 1971 production of 9.5 MMB/d;  and U.. is the demand 
projection for 1980 of 20.2 MMB/d.  The current (January 1974) welihead 
price, P,  is $6.63 and the (almost) vertical Sc, line represents the current 
short-run supply curve, with Qc being 1974 U.S. production of 9.2 MMB/d. 
(The fact that Qc is less than Qo is compatible with short-run positive user 
costs in the current period.) 
Using E8 =  1.6 and Ed =  0.5, the 1980 market-clearing  price is given by 
the intersection of the S and Dn curves as Pn ($5.36), while 1980 production 
is Qn  (16.9 MMB/d). 
After we had completed our calculations, a study group at MIT pub- 
lished an estimate for the market price for self-sufficiency  in 1980.57  Using 
a  mixture of  econometric and judgmental models  (including the  NPC 
forecasts), they concluded that "the price of energy would be from $10.00 
to  $12.00 per barrel if supplies were limited to  those within the United 
their ca  +  3  equals one minus the rent share,  and hence their supply-elasticity  formula, 
which is (a +  3)/(1 -  a  -  /),  is identical  with our equation  (4). See Robert M. Spann, 
Edward  W. Erickson,  and Stephen  W. Millsaps, "Percentage  Depletion and the Price 
and Output  of Domestic  Crude  Oil,"  in General  Tax  Reform,  Panel  Discussion  before  the 
House Committee  on Ways and Means, 93 Cong. 1 sess. (1973), Pt. 9, pp. 1318-20. 
57. The Policy Study Group of the M.I.T. Energy Laboratory,  "Energy  Self-Suffi- 
ciency: An Economic  Evaluation,"  Technology  Review,  Vol. 76 (May 1974), pp. 23-58. 440  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
Figure 3.  U.S. Supply and Demand for Crude Oil, Model Results, 1971, 
1974, and 1980a 




3.74  Po 
Qc  Qo  Qn  U. 
9.2  9.5  16.9  20.2 
Quantity  (millions  of barrels  per day) 
Source: Interpreted  from Table 1. See text for detailed explanation. 
a.  c = subscript  indicating 1974 current period. Other symbols are as defined for Figure 1. 
States."58  The MIT study differs from ours in that the authors attempted 
merely to find the price at which total demand and total supply for  all 
fossil fuels and nuclear sources combined were in balance in 1980, whereas 
we have calculated the price for balancing demand and supply for  oil 
separately.  Nevertheless, the MIT results on price appear to be much higher 
than ours. If the two studies are compared on a common base (such as our 
simple model of Figure 1), the difference is readily explained. 
The MIT group used the Erickson-Spann estimate of supply elasticity 
of 0.9 and the Hudson-Jorgenson estimate of demand elasticity of 0.15 as a 
58. Ibid., p. 28. Paul Davidson,  Laurence  H. Falk, and  Hoesung  Lee  441 
basis for the $10.00 to $12.00 estimate of Pn  (in Figure 1). Plugging these 
elasticity estimates into our model and solving for P0-the  long-run supply 
price in 1971  that would be consistent with this range for the self-sufficiency 
price in  1980-we  estimate that the MIT group is implicitly assuming a 
1971 price of between $5.10 and $6.30 (in  1974 dollars). We think this 
range for implicit base-period prices is much too high, and we suspect that 
the MIT group either let the short-run 1973 price of  $5.49 (which was 
dominated by  user cost)  color  their views or assumed that  speculative 
withholdings will continue to be profitable in 1980 because of the lack of 
appropriate  government policy.59  Table 1 indicates that if $3.74 is a more 
appropriate estimate of the long-run supply price in the base period, the 
MIT elasticities suggest a price of under $8.00 for self-sufficiency  in 1980. 
The effect on market price and quantity of allowing for imports of crude 
oil from Canada and Venezuela (in the same proportion to  total  U.S. 
production as in the base period) is shown in Table 2. Given our preferred 
elasticities, the 1980 price would be  $5.11 per barrel. If supply elasticity 
were as low as 1.4 and demand elasticity as low as 0.1, the projected price 
would rise to  $5.79 per barrel. A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 suggests 
that the importation of Canadian and Venezuelan oil is likely to reduce the 
market-clearing  price by approximately 4.7 percent and domestic produc- 
tion by approximately 7.7  percent. Thus,  it  appears that imports from 
friendly foreign sources are not likely to lower the price of "Project Inde- 
pendence" dramatically. 
Table 3 displays estimates of the market price for self-sufficiency if no 
monopoly at all existed in the oil industry-in  other words, if price were 
just  equal  to  long-run  marginal resource cost.  To  estimate  the  zero- 
monopoly price in the base period, we took  Nordhaus' estimate of  "the 
competitive supply price for domestic petroleum"60  of $2.33 in 1970, and 
59. Another possibility  is that the MIT group implicitly  assumed  that long-run  real 
marginal  factor  costs for any given production  flow will increase  over time from 36 to 
68 percent  more  than producers'  historical  expectations  of cost changes  as reflected  in Xx. 
(This  possibility  was implied  in some  comments  by Charles  L. Shultze,  in which  he argued 
that increasing  marginal  cost over time is a special characteristic  of depletable  natural 
resources.  Although  this may be a characteristic  for any given property  at any point of 
time,  as note 51 indicates,  we do not believe  it is a necessary  characteristic  of the aggregate 
of producing  properties  considered  over time.) The 1973 price of $5.49 is the midyear 
weighted  average  of prices  for "new" and "old" crude oil, calculated  from World  Oil, 
Vol. 178 (February  15, 1974), p. 73. 
60. Nordhaus, "Allocation of Energy  Resources,"  p. 557. Nordhaus notes that this 
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Table  2. Estimates  of Market  Price and  Quantity  of Crude  Oil for the 
United  States  in 1980,  Allowing  for Imports  from  Canada  and  Venezuela, 
by Selected  Elasticities 
Prices  in 1974 dollars;  quantities  in millions of barrels  per day 
Elasticity  of demand 
0.08  0.1  0.5,  1.0 
Elasticity  -  -  - 
of supply  Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity 
0.9  7.30  17.3  7.20  17.1  5.97  14.5  5.28  13.0 
1.4  5.83  17.6  5.79  17.5  5.28  15.4  4.92  13.9 
1.6k  5.53  17.7  5.50  17.6  5.11  15.6  4.82  14.2 
1.8  5.30  17.8  5.28  17.7  4.98  15.9  4.73  14.5 
2.0  5.13  17.8  5.11  17.7  4.86  16.0  4.66  14.7 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a.  Authors' preferred  estimate. 
Table  3. Estimates  of Market  Price  and  Quantity  of Crude  Oil for U.S. 
Full  Self-Sufficiency  in 1980,  Assuming  Perfect  Competition,  by Selected 
Elasticities 
Prices  in 1974 dollars; quantities  in millions of barrels  per day 
Elasticity  of demand 
0.08  0.1  0.a5  1.0 
Elasticity 
of supply  Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity 
0.9  5.87  19.5  5.82  19.3  5.13  17.3  4.72  16.0 
1.4  4.48  19.9  4.47  19.8  4.31  18.8  4.18  18.1 
1.6a  4.21  20.0  4.21  20.0  4.11  19.3  4.04  18.7 
1.8  4.01  20.1  4.00  20.1  3.96  19.7  3.92  19.3 
2.0  3.85  20.2  3.85  20.1  3.83  20.0  3.82  19.8 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a.  Authors' preferred  estimate. 
converted  it first  into our zero-monopoly,  1971  base-period  price by in- 
creasing  it in proportion  to the actual  change  in welihead  prices  between 
the two years,  and then into 1974  dollars  by the procedure  used to con- 
struct  the base price  underlying  Table 1. 
The estimated  zero-monopoly  price for full self-sufficiency  in 1980 is 
$4.11  (assuming  E8  =  1.6 and  Ed =  0.5), only 9.9 percent  higher  than the 
1971 base-period  monopoly price and dramatically  lower than current Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  443 
Table  4. Estimates  of Market  Price and Quantity  of Crude  Oil for Full 
U.S. Self-Sufficiency  in 1980,  Assuming  Increased  Substitution  of Coal 
for Oil 
Prices  in 1974 dollars;  quantities  in millions of barrels  per day 
Elasticity  of demanzd 
0.08  0.1  0.5a  1.0 
Elasticity 
of supply  Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity Price  Quantity 
0.9  6.13  14.8  6.07  14.7  5.29  13.0  4.83  11.9 
1.4  5.19  15.0  5.17  14.9  4.83  13.6  4.58  12.6 
1.6a  4.99  15.1  4.97  15.0  4.71  13.7  4.51  12.8 
1.8  4.84  15.1  4.83  15.0  4.62  13.9  4.45  13.0 
2.0  4.72  15.1  4.71  15.1  4.54  14.0  4.40  13.1 
Sources: Same as Table 1. 
a.  Authors' preferred  estimate. 
prices.  Hence,  if antitrust  or other  governmental  policies  markedly  reduced 
the degree  of monopoly  in the domestic  crude-oil  industry,  self-sufficiency 
in 1980 would be achievable  and compatible  with lower costs than con- 
sumers  are  currently  paying.  In other  words,  even  in the absence  of cheaper 
Middle Eastern  oil, the age of cheap  energy  for U.S. consumers  need not 
be over.61 
Table  4 estimates  the effects  of increased  substitution  of coal for crude 
oil on the 1980 full self-sufficiency  price. Using the U.S. government's 
assumption62  that  coal production  (in terms  of millions  of barrels  per day 
oil equivalent)  will be 11.0 MMB/d in 1980 and assuming  that all the 
increase  in coal production  from 6.2 MMB/d in the 1971  base period  will 
be used to replace  crude oil, our estimate of the self-sufficiency  price 
is $4.71. 
61. Even for the most inelastic  case in Table 3, the self-sufficiency  price of $5.87 is 
much lower than the current  $6.63 wellhead  price,  indicating  substantial  potential  bene- 
fits to consumers  of policies aimed at reducing  monopoly markups  in the domestic oil 
industry. 
62. See "Project  Independence  Background  Paper" (prepared  for the Washington 
Energy Conference,  February  1974; processed),  pp. 13-14. The Office of Coal of the 
Federal  Energy  Administration  has since revised  its estimates  to include three assump- 
tions concerning  coal production  in 1980: business  as usual-892  million  tons; business 
accelerated- 1,376 million tons; most likely-950  million tons. The last assumption  is 
similar  to the office's  initial  estimate  of 962 million  tons of coal per  year,  which  converts 
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SUMMARY 
In sum, if the degree of monopoly in the domestic oil industry in 1980 
is the same as it was in 1971, and if the government adopts policies that 
assure that the user cost inherent in crude oil is zero, then the 1980 long- 
run price for U.S. self-sufficiency  will be $5.36 (in 1974 dollars) and U.S. 
production will be 16.9 MMB/d.  If imports from friendly nations such as 
Canada and Venezuela occur in the same proportion to U.S.  production 
as they did in 1971, then the price in 1980 will be $5.11. If, on the other 
hand, coal is increasingly substituted for crude oil, we estimate the 1980 
self-sufficiency  wellhead price will be $4.71. All of these estimates assume 
our preferred  elasticities of supply (1.6) and demand (0.5). Since the January 
1974 average wellhead price of domestic crude was $6.63, these estimates 
imply a decrease of between 19.2 percent and 29.0 percent in crude prices 
in the next few years. In other words, if speculative expectations can be 
stifled and the degree of monopoly  kept at its  1971 level, self-sufficiency 
can be achieved at lower real costs to the consumers. 
Moreover, if monopoly power could be eliminated by antitrust action, 
government  regulation, the formation of a federally sponsored corporation 
to provide a competitive yardstick, or some combination of the three, then, 
as Table 3 indicates, the 1980 full self-sufficiency  price is most likely to be 
$4.11-a  decline of 38.0 percent from the January 1974 price of crude. 
Even in the most  pessimistic (and  unlikely) inelastic case  presented in 
Table 3, the 1980 zero-monopoly price would be $5.87, or approximately 
11.5 percent less than the 1974 price and only 57.0 percent higher than the 
base-period price. Thus, any policy that substantially reduces the degree 
of monopoly in the domestic oil industry could offer dramatic savings to 
consumers. 
Of course, all empirical results assume that domestic production in 1980 
involves zero user costs-that  producers do not  withhold production in 
order to  garner higher profits in  the  future. This  situation may  occur 
fortuitously in  1980 if  at  that time  entrepreneurs' views of  the  future 
happen to  agree that withholding production is  not  profitable. On the 
other hand, such an outcome is by no means inevitable; accordingly, the 
U.S.  government may need specific policies that assure it. These may in- 
volve (1) government regulation of  welihead price with the unalterable 
proviso that permitted price increases muist be phased in at an annual rate Paul Davidson, Laurence H. Falk, and Hoesung Lee  445 
that is lower than current  and expected rates of interest (so that discounted 
profits due to the price increase are negative), or (2) taxes on capital gains 
on oil reserves  and windfall profits on production at rates in excess of 100 
percent, or (3) both.63  Such policies, operating in tandem with the breaking 
up of conglomerate energy corporations into independent individual pro- 
duction units advocated in the first half of this paper, will go a long way 
toward preventing positive user costs  and their adverse impact  on  the 
production of energy resources at home and abroad. 
Finally, and most important, the reader is cautioned that the objective 
of the second half of this paper has been to provide a range of crude oil 
prices  in 1980.  If the U.S. government actively pursues  the policies we advo- 
cate, we expect the 1980 wellhead price of crude oil in the United States 
to  range between $5 and  $7 (in  1974 dollars) rather than  between $10 
and $12, as others have suggested. On the other hand, if the government 
permits a free market price for oil without altering existing conditions, the 
1980 price for self-sufficiency  could easily be even higher than $12 as the 
user-cost estimates of domestic producers encourage them to act as willing 
but silent partners  in the OPEC cartel. In that case, domestic oil prices will 
in essence be set by the sheiks on the Persian Gulf, for we see no reason to 
believe that the OPEC cartel will unravel of its own accord. 
A  FINAL  CAVEAT 
The  $5.36  price  estimated  for  the  self-sufficiency situation  in  1980 
involves an increase in annual production of crude oil of more than 75 
percent  from current  levels. Aside from positive user costs, two factors may 
limit the ability and willingness of the industry to expand by 1980 along the 
long-run supply path embodying a constant degree of monopoly. 
First, the implied increase in exploration activities between  1974 and 
1980 may be unachievable at reasonably stable input prices, as bottlenecks 
develop in the input markets: shortages may occur in drilling rigs, or in the 
supply of geologist teams, or in the funds necessary for expansion. 
In this connection, however, statistics show that the number of  shut-in 
oil-producible zones on the U.S. outer continental shelf jumped from 14.3 
63. Other policies could achieve the same objective-government-held  buffer stocks 
that could be dumped  if the price  begins  to rise, for one example.  Once the principle  of 
zero user costs is recognized  and accepted, economists should be able to conceive of 
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percent of the total completions of producible oil zones in 1971 to 44.4 per- 
cent in 1972 and 44.5 percent in  1973,64  while the number of  completed 
wells continued to grow by some 300 per year from 5,718 in 1971 to 6,421 in 
1973.  This tremendous  increase  in readily available, but unused, productive 
capacity is compatible with the sudden appearance of  large positive user 
costs in  1971 as OPEC actions began to  escalate oil  prices worldwide. 
Nevertheless, these shut-ins mean significant additional capacity already in 
place, and the remaining exploration and development costs necessary to 
achieve self-sufficiency by  1980 are thus  significantly lower (and  hence 
bottlenecks are less threatening)  than the inferences of a simple comparison 
of estimated 1980 output with current production.65 
Moreover, to the extent that the government  alters its leasing policy from 
front-loaded bonus  contracts  with fixed-percentage royalty  to  a  bonus 
system to be paid out of sales revenues (as explained in note 39), financial 
constraints will be significantly reduced because a major portion of  the 
investment costs (for land) can be financed out of sales receipts. 
Second, current (January 1974) prices of $6.63 per barrel provide huge 
windfall profits over long-run marginal factor costs,  and hence  at least 
temporarily there has been a tremendous increase in profit markups and 
therefore in the degree of monopoly  since the 1971 base  period. If pro- 
ducers (and buyers) come to accept the current  higher degree of monopoly 
as a permanent  characteristic  of the industry, the relevant long-run supply 
will shift upwards and the market-clearing self-sufficiency price  will be 
higher and production lower than our preferred  estimate. Figure 4  shows, 
for example, the long-run supply curve S(m2) for the degree of monopoly 
in  the base  period. Here, Do, Dc, and D.  represent the demand curves 
in the base period, current period, and 1980, respectively; P0,  Qo, and 
P,(m2),  Qn(m2)  are  the price  and production  levels  for the base  period  and 
for 1980, respectively. The current levels of  price and production, which 
are represented  by Pc and Q,  lie on the short-run, almost vertical, supply 
curve, Se,, and on a long-run supply curve, S(m3), which represents  a higher 
degree of monopoly (M3)  than obtained in the base period. If m3 should 
64. U.S. Geological  Survey,  Outer  Continental  Shelf Statistics (1974), p. 34. In 1965, 
for example,  the ratio of shut-ins  was 18 percent,  and the trend  was steadily  downward 
until 1972. 
65. If the United States had such a large percentage  of its total productive  facilities 
shut down, does anyone  doubt that GNP could be increased  by 75 percent  by 1980  with- 
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Figure 4.  U.S. Supply and Demand for Crude Oil, Assuming  the 1974 
Degree of Monopoly Becomes Permanenta 
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Source: See text for detailed explanation. 
a.  m2 and m3 = the 1971  and new, higher, 1974 degrees  of monopoly, respectively.  Other symbols are as 
defined for Figure 1. 
persist  through  1980,  then the self-sufficiency  price  will be Pn(m3)-which 
is higher  than  P.(m2)-and production  will  be Q(m3O-which  is lower  than 
QJ(m2). All of our self-sufficiency  estimates  are based on the assumption 
that no disruptive  bottlenecks  will occur and that monopoly will not 
intensify.  Obviously,  if these  factors  become  important  as 1980  approaches, 448  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1974 
the government  will have to develop  policies  to counteract  them. Merely 
setting  the goal of self-sufficiency,  although  desirable  from  the consumer's 
standpoint  in a cartelized  world  oil market,  is not sufficient.  The need is 
for supportive  policies  to bring  prices  in line with  long-run  factor  costs by 
reducing,  or at least  containing,  monopoly  power;  to discourage  inventory 
speculation  by reducing  the user  cost of crude  oil to zero;  and to alleviate 
bottlenecks  if they occur.66 
66. For example,  bottlenecks  may call for government  allocations  of scarce  resources 
(at constant  factor  prices),  or redefining  self-sufficiency  to include  imports  from friendly 
nations, or delay in achieving  self-sufficiency.  Since the current  degree of monopoly is 
higher than historically  normal, the government  must take steps at least to reduce 
monopoly power  to its former  level. 